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Abstract 
This paper analyses the influence of political institutions on the development of 
financial cooperatives. It proposes a political economy theory where autocratic regimes 
deliberately oppose the development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector 
to maintain their political influence, and prevent the formation of strong pressure groups 
that can threaten the current political status quo and reduce the governing elites’ 
economic benefits from underdeveloped and exclusive financial sector. Using panel 
data from 65 developing countries from 1995–2014, the results show that democracy, 
political rights and civil liberties promote financial cooperative development. These 
results are robust in controlling for endogeneity as well as other economic and 
institutional factors. 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Financial Cooperatives’ are member-owned financial institutions such as cooperative 
banks, credit unions, credit cooperatives, as well as savings and credit cooperatives. 
Existing literature suggests that financial cooperatives are better able to serve low-
income populations than other microfinance institutions, and are more stable compared 
to other investor-owned banks (Ayadi et al., 2010: 116; Birchall, 2013: 24; Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2006: 55; Hesse and Cihak, 2007). But it is still not clear why financial 
cooperatives grew in some emerging economies and not in other similar economies, and 
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there is no political economy theory or empirical investigation that explains how the 
behaviour of political institutions influences the development of the financial 
cooperative sector. Only recently, Périlleux et al. (2016) examined the relationship 
between the size of the commercial banking sector and the development of financial 
cooperatives in developing countries, arguing that financial cooperatives grow in 
countries where the commercial banking sector is relatively underdeveloped. Here, I use 
panel data for 65 developing countries covering the period from 1995 to 2014, to test 
the correlation between indicators of democracy, political rights and civil liberties 
against variables representing the degree of financial cooperatives development. In 
addition, I tried to develop a theoretical analysis that can explain the behaviour of 
political institutions towards financial cooperatives. This essay is mainly related to 
literature on the political economy of finance (Nienhaus, 1993; Pagano and Volpin, 
2001; Perotti, 2014; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and financial cooperative (or credit 
union) (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Ferguson and McKillop, 1997; Périlleux et al., 
2016). 
There are several possible factors that can explain the evolution and performance of 
financial cooperatives in developing countries, including the economic structure, the 
degree of development of the financial sector, the legal framework that governs 
financial cooperatives’ activities as well as the cultural uniqueness of each country. Yet, 
since political institutions significantly influence all these factors – keeping in mind that 
the political structure itself is influenced by these factors as well – it is important to 
understand how they can dictate the development of financial cooperatives, and the 
motives behind the behaviour of these institutions. Political institutions can provide 
supportive or obstructive environment for financial cooperatives through legislations 
and other institutional arrangements. For instance, Bamrungwon (1994: 55–62) noticed 
that excessive control by the state is strongly maintained by regulations. This is clear 
from similarities in the cooperative laws of several developing countries, where 
regulations did not only emphasize statutory provisions (such as licensing, membership, 
governance structure, property protection and equity structure), but also included 
several provisions concerning the authority of government officials over cooperatives.  
The main argument here is that autocratic regimes may deliberately oppose the 
development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector, whereas democracies 
are more willing to support the development of financial cooperatives. I do not argue 
that every country fits into this theory, but the argument comes from clear observable 
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evidence that large financial cooperative sectors in many cases exist within democratic 
political systems. In 2014, the market share of cooperative banks in many European 
democracies was quite large, amounting to 62% of the domestic deposits in France, 
36% in the Netherlands, 35% in Austria, 34% in Finland, 33% in Italy, 27% in Cyprus 
and 21% in Germany (EACB, 2015). The argument is also derived from some examples 
where the growth of financial cooperatives in developing countries is associated with a 
relatively open political system and, to a large extent, guaranteed civil rights. The 
definition of ‘developing countries’ here is based on the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) classification of emerging and developing economies in the World Economic 
Outlook of 2012 (IMF, 2012: 181) (For a list of countries included in this study, see 
Table A4.1 in the appendix). In Latin America, where almost all countries in the region 
are democracies since the 1980s, the average penetration rate
1
 in 2014 was 21.6% and 
the average assets per GDP was 2.6%, with Jamaica, Ecuador, Costa Rica, have 
impressively high penetration rates of 76%, 63% and 23%, respectively, and assets per 
GDP of 8%, 5.2% and 7.4%. 
Similarly, Benin and Senegal are amongst the most stable democracies in West Africa, 
and had the highest members’ penetration rate in Africa by the end of 2014 and 
noticeably high deposits per GDP compared to their counterparts in the region. For the 
last 20 years, Benin was ranked as free by Freedom House and Senegal as free or partly 
free. On the other side of the continent, the total assets of Kenyan financial cooperatives 
were 8.3% of its GDP in 2014, one of the highest in developing countries, with 29% 
members’ penetration rate. Kenya had implemented several social and political reforms 
in the last decade, including the adoption of a new Cooperative Societies Act in 2004, a 
new financial cooperative law in 2008 and a new Constitution in 2010. Kenya is ranked 
as partly free by Freedom House since 2002, following the national elections that 
witnessed the change in political leadership and parliamentary majority. 
Relatively low penetration rates and deposits per GDP can be noticed in other African 
countries like Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, where rights of associations remain tightly 
restricted and financial cooperatives are regulated under outdated and insufficient 
regulatory frameworks. Zimbabwe and Ethiopia ranked 44 and 46, respectively out of 
53 countries in the ‘Rights sub-category’ of Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2015 
(Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). 
                                                          
1
 Penetration rate is the total number of financial cooperatives’ members as percentage of total population 
above 15 years old, discussed more in section 4.3.1. 
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A similar comparison can be found in Southeast Asia, where penetration rates and 
assets per GDP are high in India, the Philippines and Thailand. India and the Philippians 
are electoral democracies that have vibrant civil societies, and are classified as free or 
partly free by Freedom House for the last 20 years. Thailand, according to Freedom 
House measurements, the political environment persisted in the last three decades – 
until 2014 – gave citizens opportunities to actively participate in the political sphere and 
provided legal protection for their civil rights. Thailand ranked as free or partly free 
from 1979 till 2006, following a military coup in 2006 that overthrew the 
democratically elected prime minister at that time. But the country was ranked as partly 
free again in 2008 after democratic elections were held in 2007. On the other hand, low 
penetration rates and assets per GDP can be observed in two of the severely autocratic 
political regimes in the region, Cambodia and Laos. Both countries are non-electoral 
democracies and are classified as not free by Freedom House for the last 20 years. Civil 
societies’ activities are extremely restricted, as freedoms of assembly and of association, 
as well as other human rights, are not respected. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes a political 
economy theory for financial cooperatives development. Section 3 defines the data used 
and the methodology adopted. Results are presented and interpreted in section 4. 
Section 5 serves as a conclusion. 
2. A political economy theory of financial cooperatives 
The political economy theory of financial cooperatives established in this study is based 
on the origins and history of cooperatives in developing countries, alongside pressure 
groups theory and political economy theory of the financial sector. Both theories belong 
to traditional ‘new institutional economics’ that try to explain how economic behaviour 
is shaped by the evolution and behaviour of institutions. According to these theories, the 
government is not a neutral agent in the economy, but is a prominent player who 
influences and benefits from the economic system. North (1990) and Olson (1993) 
argue that those in power shape economic policies and institutions that enable them to 
stay in power and to enrich themselves. An autocratic political system will probably 
have a strong incentive to adopt an opportunistic behaviour that exploits the economy’s 
resources and outputs, in order to maximize the rents of the ruling elites and those who 
influence the political decision-making. Thus, the distribution of these economic 
resources and benefits will depend on the bargaining power of different groups in the 
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economy (North, 1990: 49; 2005: 67; Olson, 1993: 569). But even though political 
institutions shape economic ones, the causality goes both directions. Property rights, 
contract enforcement and opportunity distribution are designed and enforced by political 
institutions; however, the economic structure of a society also shapes its political 
structure (North, 1990: 48). 
Following the same line of reasoning, an underdeveloped financial cooperative 
movement may be the result of intentional policies by political decision-makers. In a 
political system dominated by narrow elite groups, political decision-makers may 
deliberately oppose the formation of other pressure groups that represent a broad range 
of people with strong bargaining power against the ruling elites, and who will have 
more control over their own resources, mainly their deposits in the case of financial 
cooperatives. That is because (1) an autocratic ruler and governing elites will prefer to 
control cooperatives to extend their popularity and their political influence, and with 
that, people’s sense of belonging and ownership of cooperatives will decrease, as well 
as their participation (section 2.1); (2) well-organized associations will have stronger 
political bargaining power against the ruler and the governing elites (section 2.2); (3) 
the economic benefits gained by the governing elites, from underdeveloped and 
exclusive financial system, will be threatened and diminished (section 2.3). It must be 
acknowledged that the behaviour of autocrats towards financial cooperatives is not 
linear and is not identical amongst all non-democratic regimes. For instance, a stable 
autocrat, as a matter of ruling for a long-term period, will have the incentive to increase 
the overall productivity of the society in order for him, and the governing elite, to 
extract the maximum possible rent from the economy (Olson, 1993: 569). State control 
in this case will intend to encourage a minimum level of savings by the low-income 
class to secure enough finance for the higher income class to invest in projects with 
relatively high expected marginal return. Also, stable autocrats will try to guarantee a 
minimum level of return for low-income populations to avoid social dissatisfaction and 
political unrest. Thus, there will always be a minimum level of financial services 
provided to the lower income class, through cooperatives or any other institutions, even 
in the most oppressive and autocratic regimes. 
2.1. History of state control over cooperatives in developing countries 
The evolution of cooperatives in developing countries is strongly dependent on the 
colonial governments that implanted these institutions. Cooperatives did not intend to 
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be independent self-help associations that emerge spontaneously, but rather to be 
instruments for colonial governments to implement their own economic policies 
(Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 27; Mu¨nkner, 2013:13). The organizational nature of 
cooperatives changed from instruments intended to create alternative contractual 
arrangements that govern the relation between the members and the market – and 
amongst the members themselves – into government instruments that transfer credit and 
subsidies to mass populations and follow state policies (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 28). 
Thus, in developing countries, what are sometimes labelled as ‘cooperative 
organizations’, are not really cooperatives (Birchall, 2004: 6). 
Fals-Borda et al. (1976: 442) describe how most post-independence governments in 
developing countries have adopted a compulsory cooperative strategy to force people, 
especially peasants, to become members in state-organized cooperatives. Forcing people 
to join cooperatives was made possible through three ways: ‘(1) direct compulsion and 
coercion, (2) the creation of a monopolistic situation in which the individual is deprived 
of certain economic benefits if he decided to stay out, (3) the offering of inducements in 
the shape of prospective benefits’ (Fals-Borda et al., 1976: 442). They noted that in the 
1960s, the ruling parties in Iran, Venezuela and other Latin American countries, strove 
to extend their political influence in order to spread their ideologies through their 
control over the cooperative movement. Cooperatives were organized by the State in 
order to secure the political support of peasants for the existing regimes. They also 
remarked that leaders of cooperative societies in Latin America and Africa were 
extremely over-controlled by government officials. Cooperative leaders ceased to be 
true representatives of the members, and instead, they carried out instructions from 
government officials and communicated them to the members and sometimes they were 
even members of the local administration or part of the political hierarchy. 
Cooperatives’ elections did not take place on a regular basis in many cases and some 
leaders were re-elected indefinitely (Fals-Borda et al., 1976: 440–441). Similarly, 
Gagnon (1976: 376) pointed out that, during the 1960s and 1970s, cooperatives in Cuba, 
Senegal and Tunisia were not spontaneous grassroots movements, but were rather 
organized and controlled by the states and political parties in power to spread their 
policies and ideologies. And whenever cooperatives ‘[...] had the opportunity to become 
social movements, to enter the political arena, and to threat the dominant classes, they 
were rapidly curtailed by the ruling powers [...]’ Gagnon (1976: 376). 
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The history of the cooperative movement in the former communist countries provides 
additional evident for that. In Russia, the once-autonomous consumer cooperatives were 
themain suppliers for basic goods to urban populations before the revolution of 1917. 
State control over cooperatives during the totalitarian regime that followed the 
revolution had abolished the movement’s autonomy and was nationalized by Stalin in 
1935. Agricultural cooperatives that existed before the revolution were replaced by 
collective farms and were falsely named ‘cooperatives’. The same trend took place in 
many other so-called socialist countries, in which the number of cooperatives and their 
members immensely grew but without any real autonomy or member control (Birchall, 
2004: 3, 16). 
Another interesting historical event was the dissolution of the Egyptian Confederation 
of Agricultural Cooperatives in 1976. The early founded cooperatives in Egypt were 
relatively independent from the state. However, the post-independence regime led by 
Nasser seized control of the cooperative movement and completely changed its nature to 
a state-controlled organization. When Sadat took office after Nasser in 1970, he chose 
one of his prot´eg´es, Ahmed Yunis, to be the president of the Confederation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives. However, Yunis tried to establish an independent movement 
that ‘[ . . . ] would not only fall outside the domain of state control, but which would 
challenge the government and demand a say in state policy making [sic] especially that 
related to agriculture’ (Fahmy, 2002: 208–209). In 1976, Yunis refused the 
governmental pressure on the confederation to support the ruling party in the 
parliamentary elections. He stated that the confederation should be politically neutral 
and non-partisan, and called for the confederation’s full independence from any 
government intervention. In return, the government led a publicity campaign against 
Yunis, accusing him of mismanagement and corruption (Fahmy, 2002: 210). Not long 
after, Sadat disbanded the confederation in 1976 under Law 824 and transferred the 
functions of cooperatives to the state-owned Agricultural Bank. With the dissolution of 
the confederation, Sadat made sure that cooperatives could never be used to mobilize 
any opposition against his regime. The confederation remained dissolved until 1983, 
after Sadat’s assassination. The ruling party at that time won all the seats of the 
confederation council in its first elections (Fahmy, 2002: 211).  
In brief, as Develtere and Pollet (2008: 64–65) explained, governments can either 
maintain cooperatives’ autonomy and independence or they can take control over the 
sector. Government control can be ‘defensive’ or ‘instrumental’. A ‘Defensive’ attitude 
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is when a government attempts to keep tight control over all civil society activities for 
its own political interests. ‘Instrumental’ attitude on the other hand is when a 
government uses cooperatives as instruments to implement its economic development 
policy. 
2.2. Theories of pressure groups 
Olson (1965: 111–112) relates the development of pressure group theories to the rise of 
pluralism; a political philosophy that argues for a greater constitutional and political 
role for private associations of all types – especially labour unions, churches and 
cooperatives – whilst the state should have limited control over these associations. 
‘Pluralism tends to create a mood favourable to pressure groups primarily because it 
emphasizes the spontaneity, the liberty and the voluntary quality of the private 
association’ Olson (1965: 112). Politics can be affected by organized groups in two 
ways: directly, by lobbying to influence political decision-makers, and indirectly, by 
mobilizing voters or demonstrations. Modern pressure group theories emphasize the 
influence of pressures produced by different groups, as the fundamental determinant of 
economic structure and distribution of political power in a society (Becker, 1983; 
Bentley, 1908; Commons, 1950; Latham, 1952; Truman, 1958). Pressure group theories 
date back to the 19th and early 20th Century political philosophers, especially Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805–1859) and Pierre–Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865). 
In the United States, Arthur Bentley (1870–1957) argued that conflicting group 
pressures are the key to understanding government policies. He shaped his argument in 
denying any significance to individual interests, stressing that the main effective forces 
in societies are groups’ interests and actions. Nevertheless, as no one group can 
represent all the members in a society; people will naturally tend to group together in 
associations, unions, cooperatives and other representative associations that can protect 
their interests and increase their bargaining power. Bentley states that ‘all phenomena of 
government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another and 
pushing out new groups and group representatives’ (Bentley, 1908: 269). Following 
Bentley’s view, Earl Latham (1952) stressed the importance of studying groups’ 
interests as the primary force in economics and politics. For him, ‘the structure of 
society is associational’ (Latham, 1952: 17). Like Bentley and Latham, David Truman 
(1958: 33–35) pointed out that there are inevitable disturbances and dislocations from 
economic institutions that will naturally lead to the formation of occupational 
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associations like workers and farmers associations, in order to influence government 
policies.  
Commons (1950: 30) had strongly supported the formation of economic pressure 
groups, arguing these groups, such as cooperatives, labour unions and farmers’ 
associations, were the most dynamic institutions and ‘the lifeblood of democracy’ 
(Olson, 1965: 116). Commons promoted occupational pressure groups as the ideal 
representative and beneficial actors in economic policies. He based his argument on the 
view that market mechanisms alone cannot bring fair outcomes for all groups in the 
economy, and the reason behind that is the unequal bargaining power that different 
groups possess. Such inequalities in bargaining power will exist as long as the wealthy 
group dominates political institutions, and thus, pressure groups are essential in 
Commons’ argument to achieve a just and rational economic system (Olson, 1965: 
115). 
The most relevant part for the argument here is Commons’ opinion on the United States 
Bill of Rights. For him, the Bill is important not only because it guarantees freedom of 
speech, press and investigation, but most importantly, that it protects the rights of 
association. He further explains how the totalitarian authorities of Russian Communism 
and Italian Fascism after the First World War weakened labour unions and cooperative 
movements. As Commons puts it, ‘the civil liberties that make possible the voluntary 
associations of labour unions, farmers unions, business cooperatives, and political 
parties . . . [is] the refugee of modern Liberalism and Democracy from Communism, 
Fascism, or Banker Capitalism’ (Commons, 1990: 901–903). Mancur Olson (1965) in 
the Logic of Collective Action pointed out that all large well-organized economic 
groups that have significant lobbying power were originally organized for another non-
political purpose in the first place. He noted that, ‘[...] the common characteristic which 
distinguishes all of the large economic groups with significant lobbying organizations is 
that these groups are also organized for some other purpose’ (Olson, 1965: 132). Olson 
recognized that most of group formation costs are start-up costs, and once a group has 
been organized, the costs associated with engaging in political actions become relatively 
low. Political actions, such as lobbying to influence the political and economic policies, 
become natural by-products of the group with relatively low-costs, since the costs of 
group formation has already been mobilized. Labour unions, farmers cooperatives and 
all large economic organizations that were able to create influential lobbies initially had 
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‘the capacity to mobilize a latent group with selective incentives’, in order to overcome 
the collective-action problem (Olson, 1965: 132). 
Financial cooperatives can easily overcome the ‘collective-action problem’ of group 
organizing identified by Olson, due to their ability to provide ‘selective incentives’. 
According to Olson, organizations that can provide ‘selective incentives’ are those that 
(1) have the ability to be coercive, or (2) have the ability to provide positive incentives. 
Many independent and strong cooperative federations in developing countries had 
succeeded in influencing the policies and legislations regulating the operations of their 
affiliates, for example, ANGKASA, Malaysia; SNCF, Singapore and URECOCI, Cote 
d’Ivoire (ILO, 2001: 63). Similarly, the Kenya Union of Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives (KUSCCO) had recently opposed the retrenchment policies in Kenya, 
mainly because many public sector employees are members in Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOs). KUSCCO also advocated against the taxation of 
SACCOs (Owen, 2007: 18), and it was behind the enactment of the SACCO Act in 
2008 (Wanyama, 2008: 91). On the other hand, many autocratic governments in 
developing countries would naturally resist the development of such representative 
associations because of their potential political power. 
2.3. Political economy theories of financial development
2
 
Political economy theories of financial development explain the distributional output of 
the financial sector, and argue that political institutions shape the level of an economy’s 
financial development. Narrow political and industrial elites, who control political 
institutions, will use their influence and networks to have preferential access to finance, 
whilst ensuring other potential competitors’ accessibility to finance is reduced.However, 
democracy should limit the influence of narrow elite groups and redistribute political 
power to a wider range of people who would favour a well-functioning financial sector 
(Girma and Shortland, 2008: 568). Rajan and Zingales (2003: 18–21) proposed an 
interest group theory of financial development where industrial and financial elites have 
a direct interest in opposing financial development. As they are small enough to 
organize (Olson, 1965), and have large economic weight, these elites can successfully 
influence political leadership to keep the financial sector underdeveloped. Large firms 
can finance new opportunities without the need for external capital, or can obtain 
                                                          
2
 For a comprehensive overview on theories of political economy of finance, see Pagano and Volpin 
(2001) and Perotti (2014). 
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finance by pledging their assets as collaterals. Thus, in underdeveloped financial 
system, they have positional rent in their markets resulting from their privileged access 
to capital. Additionally, even if new entrants can obtain capital, the narrow group of 
industrial and financial elites will still be able to capture most of the returns gained by 
these new entrants, through higher interest rates, since they own and control financial 
institutions. These rents will diminish or even disappear with financial development. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003: 22) argued that economic openness, in term of trade and 
capital flows, will weaken the industrial and financial elites’ ability to resist financial 
development. That is because foreign trade increases competition and reduces domestic 
rents, putting pressure on industrial elites. Similarly, cross-border capital flow will 
reduce the financiers’ oligopolistic position if domestic corporates can have access to 
cheaper finance. However, that does not provide a clear explanation to the behaviour of 
political institutions towards financial development, especially that economic openness 
is argued to be a political choice in itself (Perotti, 2014: 17). Barth et al. (2006: 278–
286) proposed a social conflict view of bank supervision and regulation that explains 
why some countries may intentionally choose inefficient banking regulatory and 
supervisory policies that produces inefficient outcomes. The social conflict view argues 
that financial regulatory and supervisory policies are not chosen by the entire society or 
for the benefit of the whole society. The state is more concerned about distribution and 
not efficiency, and the ruling group does not seek to maximize the total social welfare 
but rather to maximize its own. In closed autocratic regimes, financial regulations then 
will be chosen by those in power for the benefit of a narrow politically influential 
group, whereas a more open and democratic political system may reduce the power and 
benefits of such narrow elites. However, democracy will not totally eliminate their 
influence. Inefficient banking policies are also favoured by autocratic regimes because 
they can protect the interests of elites by limiting other groups’ economic and political 
potentials. 
Girma and Shortland (2008: 570–571) explained how in underdeveloped financial 
systems, access to capital will be associated with connections or wealth. The allocation 
of credit will depend on borrowers’ collaterals, social position and political connections, 
whilst a well-developed financial system allows firms and individuals to obtain credit 
upon the feasibility of their economic activities and needs. Therefore, the government 
and elite groups will tend to determine the level of financial development based on the 
costs of increased competition incurred from easing the accessibility of credit. In 
12 
 
political economy theory, the ‘equilibrium’ level of financial development is then 
determined by the relative power of financial development beneficiaries and 
adversaries. Also, when the financial sector is underdeveloped, small and rural 
households tend to keep a portion of their savings in the form of real assets (e.g. gold 
and jewellery). The other portion is mobilized in the hands of few large banks that 
refuse to provide credit to these small depositors afterwards. In both cases, these small 
communities and rural areas are confronted with an inefficient resources utilization 
problem, because local resources are rarely utilized in productive investments inside 
these local communities. Financial cooperatives are best able to mobilize local resources 
for the benefit of the local economy (Nienhaus, 1993: 18). 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) were the first to propose and provide empirical evidence that 
governments controlled by narrow elite groups obstruct the development of the financial 
sector. Similarly, Girma and Shortland (2004) also found a statistically significant 
relationship between the annual change in financial development and the degree of 
democracy and stability of the political system. Barth et al. (2006: 286–305) examined 
the relationship between political institutions and bank supervisory and regulatory 
frameworks. Their findings suggest that autocratic political regimes tend to have large 
state-owned banks and are more likely to impose regulatory restrictions on bank 
operations. They argued that autocratic regimes have large state-owned banks to easily 
channel financial resources towards the ruling elite, and to control financiers by creating 
regulatory restrictions. 
Briefly, a banking system dominated only by state-owned or private commercial banks, 
investment and lending decisions lie in the hands of the government and banks’ large 
shareholders. Thus, the allocation and use of depositors’ money will not be controlled 
by the depositors themselves, who are the real owners of the money; instead, it will be 
in the hands of a narrow elite group that is formulated by large capitalists and that can 
influence political decision-makers. As a result, an independent financial cooperative 
sector that can mobilize local resources for the benefit of the mass population will not 
be favoured by autocratic political decision-makers, as cooperatives would limit the 
exploitation capacity of the government and narrow elite groups. 
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3. Data and method 
3.1. Measuring financial cooperatives development 
The development of the whole financial sector is usually measured using indicators 
covering the sector’s size, depth, efficiency and stability (Beck and Levine, 1999). 
However, statistics on financial cooperatives that cover all these indicators are not 
available in most countries. The variables used here to measure financial cooperatives 
development can only reflect the sector’s size and depth but do not give insight on the 
level of efficiency or stability of the sector. Financial cooperatives’ data were obtained 
from the World Council of Credit Union’s (WOCCU) statistical reports, which are 
based on financial cooperatives responses to the WOCCU’s annual survey, and are the 
most comprehensive dataset available for financial cooperatives. Only for India, 
additional data were collected from the National Federation of State Cooperative Banks 
regarding primary agricultural credit societies, which are not covered by the WOCCU 
dataset. 
Three indicators are used as dependent variables that can define the degree of 
development in the financial cooperative sector. First variable is member penetration 
rate, which is calculated as the country’s total number of financial cooperatives’ 
members as percentage of the total economically active population (obtained from 
International Labour Organization - ILO). The penetration rate shows the proportion of 
citizens who are members in financial cooperatives. This variable can reflect the 
financial cooperatives’ ability to attract and organize people. Second and third variables 
are total assets per GDP and total deposits per GDP. Both variables show the sector’s 
size in the national economy. The three variables were log transformed to normalize 
data distribution. Assuming here that, high penetration rate, total assets per GDP and 
total deposits per GDP reflect a well-developed financial cooperative sector in a 
country. 
3.2. Measuring the quality of political institutions 
Finding reliable measurements for the quality of political institutions is challenging, 
mostly because the meaning of democracy has been a controversial issue in political 
science (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005: 48). Three measurements for political 
institutions are used here: Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties indices, 
and Polity index from the Polity IV Project. The Freedom House’s political rights and 
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civil liberties indices have been previously used for studying trends in democracy by 
various scholars including Barro (1999: 160–162) as well as Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005: 48–63) who only used the political rights index. Originally, both indices range 
from 1 to 7, in which 7 represents the least political freedom – in terms of political 
rights and civil liberties – and 1 represents the freest. However, the values of both 
indices were reversed so that 1 becomes the lowest score in political rights and civil 
liberties score and 7 represents the highest score. 
The Polity index was also used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005: 48–63), and it ranges 
from +10 to −10, in which +10 represents strongly democratic institutions and −10 
represents strongly autocratic ones. The Polity index is computed by subtracting the 
democracy and autocracy indices of the Polity IV project. Both, the democracy and 
autocracy indices range from 0 to 10. (Marshall, et al., 2014: 14–16). 
3.3. Methodology 
Linear relationships are assumed between financial cooperatives’ indicators and 
indicators of democracy, political rights and civil liberties, using unbalanced panel 
regressions covering the period from 1995 to 2014 for 65 developing countries. Three 
methods were used to estimate the parameter values, ordinary least squares (OLS), 
random- and fixed-effects OLS (FE OLS), and fixed-effects instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions. 
The basic structure for the OLS regression models take the form of 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, representing in the model the logarithm of 
variables used as indication for the development of the financial cooperative sector in 
country 𝑖 at year 𝑡. Specifically, 𝑦 represents log(penetration rate), log(deposits per 
GDP), and log(assets per GDP). Moreover, 𝛼 is the intercept, and 𝑋 is a set of 
explanatory variables (independent variables). The explanatory variables are polity 
index, political rights index and civil liberties index, in addition to a set of variables to 
control for annual economic growth rate, gross domestic production (GDP) per capita, 
unemployment rate, percentage of people living in urban areas (urban population), 
domestic credit provided to private sector by banks as percentage of the GDP, financial 
freedom, property rights and geographic region. Tables 1 and 2 below provide a brief 
description on the variables included in the model. Furthermore, 𝛽 are the coefficients 
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that need to be estimated to determine the potential relationship between the dependent 
variables 𝑦 and each explanatory variable in 𝑋. The error term in the panel regression is 
denoted by 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡, where 𝜇𝑖  denotes the time-invariant and unobservable country-
specific effect or idiosyncratic error term, that differs across countries, and not included 
in the regression (e.g. historical and cultural country-specifications). And, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the 
remainder disturbance which varies across countries and years, with similar 
characteristics to the usual “error term” of any linear regression equation, assumed to be 
homoscedastic, normally distributed with a mean equals to zero, uncorrelated with 
itself, and uncorrelated with  𝜇𝑖 and 𝑋. 
Table 1. Information on the data sources and variables used 
Variable Description Source 
Financial cooperatives variables (dependent variables) 
Penetration rate 
Total number of financial cooperatives’ members in 
a country as percentage of the total economically 
active population. The variable was log transformed 
to normalize data distribution. 
World 
Council of 
Credit Unions 
and 
International 
Labour 
Organization 
Total deposits 
per GDP 
Total deposits of financial cooperatives in a country 
as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
at market prices. The variable was log transformed. 
World 
Council of 
Credit Unions 
and World 
Bank Open 
Data 
Total assets per 
GDP
3
 
Total assets of financial cooperatives in a country as 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 
market prices. The variable was log transformed. 
Political institutions variables (explanatory variables) 
Political rights 
Measures the citizens’ ability to voluntarily 
participate in the political process, including: the 
right to vote in transparent and legitimate elections 
to choose freely among different alternatives; the 
right to compete for public office; the right to 
voluntarily form and join political parties and 
associations; and to choose representatives who 
participate in the formation of public policies and 
are accountable to the people.  
Freedom 
House 
Civil liberties 
Measures the protection of the right to organise and 
freedom of associations, as well as freedoms of 
expression and believe, and the protection of the 
overall personal freedom.  
Polity 
Reflects the institutionalised political characteristics 
of a regime. 
Polity IV 
project 
Excluded instrumental variables 
                                                          
3 
Missing data for total assets in West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) were calculated using average total assets to total deposits ratio 
from other available years of the same country. 
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Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
Measures perceptions of the possibility that the 
government will be replaced by unconstitutional or 
violent actions, including politically-driven violence 
that causes political unrest.  
World Bank’s 
World 
Governance 
Indicators. Government 
effectiveness 
Measures perceptions of the quality of public and 
civil services, and the government’s ability to design 
and implement effective policies independently 
from political pressures, as well as the credibility of 
the state to commit to such policies.  
Control variables 
Annual GDP 
growth rate 
Annual percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate at market prices.  
World Bank 
Open Data 
GDP per capita  
Calculated as the annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) divided by midyear population of a country. 
Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars and were log 
transformed. 
Unemployment 
rate 
Percentage of unemployed labour force that is 
available and willing to be employed.  
Urban 
population 
Percentage of a country’s population living in urban 
areas as defined by national statistical offices.  
Domestic Credit 
provided to 
private sector by 
banks as 
percentage of 
GDP
4
 
Financial resources provided by depository 
institutions to the private sector that create a claim 
for repayment, as percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at market prices.  
Inflation rate 
Calculated using the implicit deflator of the annual 
growth rate of the GDP that is a ratio of GDP in 
current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency.  
Property rights 
Measures the degree to which private property rights 
are secured by clear and enforceable laws or not, 
and evaluates the independence and corruption of 
the judiciary, as well as the ability of individuals 
and firms to enforce contracts.  
Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
released by 
the Heritage 
Foundation 
Financial 
freedom 
Measures the independence of the banking sector 
from government control and interference.  
Geographic 
region 
A dummy variable that takes the value of (1) for 
African Countries, (2) for Asian Countries, (3) for 
European Countries, and (4) for Countries from 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
 
Table 2. Data description 
 Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Obs. 
Log penetration rate -1,505 0,754 -4,471 -0,109 1108 
                                                          
4 
Data for Uzbekistan were collected from the IMF country reports (No. 07/133; 08/235; and 13/278) and 
for Zimbabwe from the Central bank, under domestic statistics (available at 
http://www.rbz.co.zw/assets/monthly-economic-data-from-2009-to-date.pdf). 
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Log deposits per GDP -2,643 0,920 -5,997 -0,924 1065 
Log assets per GDP  -2,460 0,906 -5,706 -0,835 1035 
Political rights 4,612 1,812 1,000 7,000 1108 
Civil liberties 4,545 1,325 1,000 7,000 1108 
Polity 4,598 5,421 -9,000 10,000 1108 
Annual GDP growth rate 0,044 0,040 -0,177 0,352 1107 
GDP per capita  3,168 0,473 2,104 4,051 1108 
Unemployment rate 0,078 0,061 0,001 0,393 1108 
Urban population 0,476 0,208 0,098 0,952 1108 
Credit provided to private sector 
by banks as percentage of GDP 
0,335 0,261 0,014 1,657 1108 
Inflation rate 0,095 0,181 -0,270 4,158 1108 
Property rights 0,408 0,158 0,050 0,900 1108 
Financial freedom 0,483 0,163 0,100 0,900 1108 
Political stability and absence of 
violence 
-0,411 0,707 -2,390 1,057 921 
Government effectiveness -0,321 0,571 -1,585 1,278 921 
 
 
The OLS estimator ignores the longitudinal structure of the data and assumes that 𝜇𝑖 is 
equal to zero, unlike the fixed and random-effects estimators that consider the presence 
of unobserved heterogeneity between the countries. The fixed-effect estimator, known 
as the within estimator, assume 𝜇𝑖 as fixed parameters that do not have a distribution. It 
controls for all country-specific effects and these time-invariant parameters are omitted. 
The remainder disturbances 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (IID), while 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be correlated with 𝜇𝑖 and independent from 
𝜈𝑖𝑡  for all countries 𝑖 at any period 𝑡 (Baltagi, 2005: 12-13 and Stata, 2013: 366). The 
fixed-effect estimator performs OLS regression on  
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) = 𝛼 + (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)𝛽 + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖). (2) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test and Lagram-Multiplier test were estimated to 
determine the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the panel data. 
Following that, Huber-White sandwich robust estimator was used to correct for the 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation found in the panel data. Generally, the 
coefficients estimated by Huber-White robust estimator of variance are similar to the 
coefficients produced by the non-robust estimators, however, Huber-White robust 
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estimator produces “correct” standard errors (in a statistical sense). Using the robust 
estimator of variance allows us to relax the assumption of identically distributed 
disturbances 𝑣𝑖𝑡 over the panels, and the no serial correlation assumption in the fixed-
effect regressions (Stata, 2013: 383). Finally, ‘Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test for random-effects’ was computed to decide between OLS regressions and random-
effects regressions, and ‘Hausman Fixed Random Test’ to decide between choosing the 
random-effects or the fixed-effects models. I report regression results obtained only 
from the OLS and fixed-effects estimations following Hausman-test results and the high 
correlation between the country-specific effects 𝜇𝑖 and the explanatory variables 𝑋 
found in all the regressions, all which suggest fixed-effects estimations to be more 
efficient than random-effects estimations for the analysis. Nevertheless, the random-
effects predictions had slightly higher statistical significance and higher coefficients 
when financial cooperatives indicators are regressed against political rights and civil 
liberties indices compared to the fixed-effects estimations, while there is almost no 
difference in polity regressions. 
The OLS estimators do not solve the possible endogeneity problem in the panel 
regressions, and treat all explanatory variables as exogenous which can make OLS 
estimates inconsistent, as it will only measure the magnitude of the correlation but not 
the magnitude and direction of possible causal relation between the independent and the 
explanatory variables. Endogeneity problem exists when an explanatory variable is 
correlated with the error term as a result of not including all relevant variables in the 
model or because of sample selectivity caused by data availability or any other reasons. 
To assess the possible causal effect of political institutions on financial cooperatives it is 
important to control for unobservable variables that are correlated with political 
institutions and affect financial cooperatives at the same time, taking into account that 
there is no econometric method that can prove causation in the absolute meaning of the 
word. One way to address the endogeneity problem in political institutions indicators is 
to use instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, as 
recommended by Baltagi (2005: 113) and Stock and Watson (2007: 332-334). The IV 
regression divides the explanatory variables in set 𝑋 of equation (1) into endogenous 
and exogenous variables, where endogenous variables, 𝑋1, are assumed to be correlated 
with the error term 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 , and the exogenous variables, 𝑋2, are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. IV method uses additional variables 𝑍 as instruments, 
to help in predicting the values of the endogenous explanatory variables 𝑋1, so that 𝑍 
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should be correlated with 𝑋1 but also uncorrelated with the error term. In this model, 
democracy, political rights and civil liberties indices are the endogenous variables and 
are instrumented by the World Bank’s “political stability and absence of violence” and 
“government effectiveness” indices. The typical IV 2SLS regression can be denoted by 
the following two equations: 
𝑋1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑡𝛿2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ?̂?1𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. (4) 
In the first stage (3), the endogenous variables 𝑋1 - democracy, political rights and civil 
liberty indices - are regressed against the exogenous variables 𝑋2 in addition to the 
excluded instruments 𝑍. The predicted values resulted from the first stage OLS 
regressions can be denoted by ?̂?1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿1. Following that, the second stage of the 
2SLS described in equation (4), regresses 𝑦𝑖𝑡 on the predicted values ?̂?1𝑖𝑡 using OLS 
regression to estimate the causal effect of political institutions on financial cooperatives. 
The main idea behind IV regression is to find instruments that can explain part of the 
variation in the endogenous variables 𝑋1 and that is unrelated to the error term. Valid 
instruments must have a direct and strong correlation with democracy, political rights 
and civil liberties indices, but also must not be correlated with the financial cooperatives 
indicators. The second condition is called the “exclusion restriction”. It is not an easy 
task to find valid instruments for political indicators, as Treisman (2007: 236) pointed 
out that researchers have not found any consistent instruments for political institutions; 
however, I attempted to instrument for democracy, political rights and civil liberties 
indices using the World Bank’s political stability and government effectiveness 
indicators.  
The political stability and absence of violence indicator measures perceptions of the 
possibility that the government will be replaced by unconstitutional or violent actions, 
including politically-driven violence that causes political unrest. The government 
effectiveness indicator measures perceptions of the quality of public and civil services, 
and the government’s ability to design and implement effective policies independently 
from political pressures, as well as the credibility of the state to commit to such policies 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009: 6). The relationship between democracy and political stability 
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is highly controversial. Some scholars argue that a prerequisite for the existence of 
democratic institutions is to secure domestic safety and stability, whereas many political 
scientists claim that the causal mechanism is reversed. Many scholars argued that 
democratic systems are vulnerable to social discontent which may lead to social and 
political instability, while others suggested that democracies promote political stability 
through several mechanisms that absorb social dissatisfaction, settle political conflict 
and redistribute economic opportunities (Tusalem, 2015). Government effectiveness, on 
the other hand, is assumed to be correlated with democracy, in line with La porta et al. 
(1999: 239) who found democracy and political rights measurements to be correlated 
with low level of government intervention, more efficiency and better public goods 
provided. I do not argue here that there is an absolute one-way causal relationship 
between perceptions of political stability or government effectiveness and the quality of 
political institutions, rather what matters for the analysis is that political stability and 
government effectiveness should explain a considerable part of the variation in the 
democracy, political rights and civil liberties indices, and to be uncorrelated with 
financial cooperatives’ penetration rate, deposits per GDP and assets per GDP. Table 1 
provide an overview over variables used. 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 3 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between indicators of financial 
cooperative development and political institutions and the IV. Generally, Table 4.3 
gives preliminary support for the argument adopted here that financial cooperatives 
correlate with the governing political institutions. Results indicate that penetration rate, 
deposits and assets per GDP are positively correlated with political rights, civil liberties 
and polity indices, significant at the 1% level, with higher correlation between financial 
cooperatives’ indicators and civil liberties. Deposits and assets per GDP are not 
significantly correlated with the IV; political stability and government effectiveness, 
whereas penetration rate are positively correlated with the IV significant at the 1% level 
and 5% level, respectively, the magnitude of the correlations is quite low which do not 
largely disturb the validity of the instruments. More importantly, political rights, civil 
liberties and polity indices are positively correlated with political stability and 
government effectiveness with relatively high correlation coefficient and significant at 
the 1% level.  
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Table 3. Pairwise correlation coefficients among the dependent, explanatory and 
instrumental variables 
 
Log 
penetration 
rate 
Log 
deposits 
per GDP 
Log 
assets per 
GDP 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polity 
financial cooperatives against political institutions 
Political 
rights 
0.233∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗    
Civil 
liberties 
0.306∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗    
Polity 0.261∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗    
N 1108 1065 1035    
Instrumental variables against  financial cooperatives and political institutions 
Political 
stability 
0.089∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.008 0.413∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 
Government 
effectiveness 
0.071∗∗ −0.007 −0.014 0.571∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 
N 921 883 868 921 921 921 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the FE OLS and the IV2SLS regressions. In these 
regressions, each of the three financial cooperatives’ indicators: penetration rate; 
deposits per GDP and assets per GDP (all dependent variables are in natural logarithm), 
is regressed against variables representing indicators of political rights, degree of 
democracy and civil liberties, in addition to a set of variables to control for economic 
growth, GDP per capita, inflation rate, unemployment rate, credit to private sector as 
percentage of the GDP, financial freedom and property rights. Columns 1 to 9 in Table 
4 show statistically significant positive correlations between the quality of political 
institutions and the degree of financial cooperatives development, with the magnitude of 
the coefficients increase considerably in the IV 2SLS regression compared to the FE 
OLS regressions, especially for the civil liberties regressions in columns 2,5 and 8. The 
𝑅2 (within) for the fixed-effects estimations ranged between 33.8% and 39.9%, whereas 
the 𝑅2 (within) for IV 2SLS estimations varied between 21% and 33%. These results 
support the political economy theory developed earlier in this study, which argues that 
representative and open political institutions tend to have well-functioning financial 
cooperative sector, represented by high penetration rates, deposits and assets per GDP, 
whilst autocratic political regimes, on the other hand, are more likely to oppose the 
development of financial cooperatives. The high magnitude of the civil liberties’ 
coefficients and their statistical significance in all regressions, compared to political 
rights and polity coefficients, suggest that underdeveloped financial cooperative 
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movements are likely to be associated with the oppression of civil societies in general, 
suggesting that non-democratic regimes may perceive financial cooperatives as 
potential pressure groups that may threaten the current status quo.  
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Table 4. Fixed-effects OLS regression results for financial cooperatives indicators against democracy, political rights and civil 
liberties indices (developing countries 1995-2014) 
Dependent variable Log Penetration rate Log deposits per GDP Log Assets per GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political  
rights 
0.048∗ 
  
0.095∗∗∗ 
  
0.069∗ 
  
(0.029) 
  
(0.034) 
  
(0.036) 
  
Civil  
liberties 
 
0.121∗∗ 
  
0.207∗∗∗ 
  
0.188∗∗ 
 
 
(0.057) 
  
(0.070) 
  
(0.072) 
 
Polity   
0.038∗∗∗ 
  
0.031∗∗ 
  
0.028∗∗ 
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.014) 
  
(0.013) 
GDP growth rate 
0.660∗∗ 0.687∗∗ 0.545∗ −0.311 −0.244 −0.287 −0.252 −0.200 −0.282 
(0.317) (0.312) (0.321) (0.631) (0.593) (0.626) (0.558) (0.530) (0.559) 
Log GDP  
per capita 
1.109∗ 0.958° 1.169∗∗ 1.174∗ 0.887 1.142° 1.113∗ 0.856 1.138∗ 
(0.590) (0.599) (0.573) (0.671) (0.690) (0.695) (0.656) (0.680) (0.666) 
Inflation  
rate 
−0.105 −0.095 −0.092 −0.216° −0.195° −0.199 −0.219° −0.206° −0.204 
(0.131) (0.127) (0.139) (0.134) (0.124) (0.140) (0.137) (0.127) (0.144) 
Unemployment rate 
0.965 1.031 0.766 2.122° 2.238∗ 1.934° 1.099 1.177 0.940 
(1.113) (1.126) (1.067) (1.277) (1.276) (1.222) (1.174) (1.193) (1.132) 
Urban  
population 
1.386 1.429 1.109 2.182∗ 2.367∗ 2.382∗ 2.557∗∗ 2.619∗∗ 2.524∗∗ 
(1.239) (1.207) (1.160) (1.269) (1.238) (1.337) (1.149) (1.106) (1.175) 
Credit to  
private sector 
0.775∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗ 
(0.229) (0.222) (0.229) (0.283) (0.271) (0.286) (0.268) (0.257) (0.269) 
Financial  
freedom 
0.596∗∗ 0.563∗∗ 0.645∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 
(0.267) (0.261) (0.250) (0.277) (0.277) (0.273) (0.290) (0.278) (0.279) 
Property  
rights 
−1.367∗∗∗ −1.307∗∗∗ −1.224∗∗∗ −1.688∗∗∗ −1.556∗∗∗ −1.490∗∗∗ −1.650∗∗∗ −1.601∗∗∗ −1.473∗∗∗ 
(0.323) (0.310) (0.294) (0.348) (0.336) (0.347) (0.344) (0.324) (0.316) 
Constant −5.978∗∗∗ −5.852∗∗∗ −6.031∗∗∗ −8.083∗∗∗ −7.789∗∗∗ −7.875∗∗∗ −7.649∗∗∗ −7.395∗∗∗ −7.592∗∗∗ 
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(1.539) (1.551) (1.491) (1.731) (1.729) (1.790) (1.698) (1.710) (1.714) 
F-stat 10.2∗∗∗ 11.04∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗ 11.37∗∗∗ 12.99∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗ 12.96∗∗∗ 15.53∗∗∗ 13.89∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1107 1107 1107 1064 1064 1064 1034 1034 1034 
No. of countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
𝑅2 (within) 0.3718 0.3851 0.3991 0.342 0.3615 0.3385 0.3546 0.3774 0.3576 
Corr(𝜇𝑖, 𝑋) −0.778 −0.764 −0.785 −0.818 −0.806 −0.825 −0.818 −0.803 −0.822 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
° indicates significance between 10% and 15% level, while no asterisk means the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Huber-White sandwich robust estimator was used to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in 
the panel data as determined by Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Lagram-Multiplier tests. 
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Table 5. Fixed-effects IV 2sls regression results for financial cooperatives indicators against democracy, political rights and civil 
liberties indices (developing countries 1995-2014) 
Dependent 
variable 
Log Penetration rate Log deposits per GDP Log Assets per GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political  
rights 
0.124∗∗∗ 
  
0.079 
  
0.122∗∗ 
  
(0.045) 
  
(0.065) 
  
(0.058) 
  
Civil  
liberties 
 
0.392∗∗∗ 
  
0.236∗ 
  
0.373∗∗∗ 
 
 
(0.105) 
  
(0.138) 
  
(0.129) 
 
Polity   
0.115∗∗∗ 
  
0.072∗∗ 
  
0.095∗∗∗ 
  
(0.025) 
  
(0.034) 
  
(0.028) 
GDP growth rate 
0.508∗ 0.556∗ −0.146 0.117 0.146 −0.277 0.006 0.077 −0.482 
(0.308) (0.315) (0.376) (0.441) (0.417) (0.504) (0.397) (0.385) (0.455) 
Log GDP  
per capita 
1.312∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗ 1.208∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 
(0.215) (0.228) (0.246) (0.313) (0.304) (0.329) (0.287) (0.295) (0.314) 
Inflation 
 rate  
0.199∗ 0.146 0.308∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.046 0.047 0.086 0.016 0.173 
(0.104) (0.112) (0.116) (0.149) (0.148) (0.155) (0.137) (0.140) (0.147) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.782 1.204° 0.513 2.091∗∗ 2.335∗∗ 1.815∗ 1.416° 1.711∗ 1.076 
(0.686) (0.755) (0.747) (0.989) (0.997) (1.015) (0.905) (0.926) (0.952) 
Urban  
population 
0.792° 1.102∗∗ −0.103 1.934∗∗ 2.150∗∗∗ 1.443∗ 2.256∗∗∗ 2.626∗∗∗ 1.562∗∗ 
(0.544) (0.528) (0.629) (0.789) (0.701) (0.838) (0.702) (0.655) (0.777) 
Credit to  
private sector 
0.613∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 
(0.107) (0.125) (0.134) (0.153) (0.165) (0.180) (0.142) (0.153) (0.166) 
Financial  
freedom 
0.540∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 
(0.119) (0.134) (0.123) (0.171) (0.176) (0.167) (0.156) (0.162) (0.160) 
Property  
rights 
−1.280∗∗∗ −1.167∗∗∗ −0.909∗∗∗ −1.453∗∗∗ −1.369∗∗∗ −1.219∗∗∗ −1.507∗∗∗ −1.446∗∗∗ −1.125∗∗∗ 
(0.159) (0.155) (0.159) (0.230) (0.204) (0.214) (0.219) (0.201) (0.206) 
_cons −6.628∗∗∗ −6.831∗∗∗ −7.144∗∗∗ −8.20∗∗∗ −8.272∗∗∗ −8.427∗∗∗ −8.112∗∗∗ −8.127∗∗∗ −8.472∗∗∗ 
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(0.639) (0.681) (0.696) (0.929) (0.903) (0.933) (0.855) (0.844) (0.894) 
F-stat 48.13∗∗∗ 42.08∗∗∗ 42.1∗∗∗ 34.36∗∗∗ 35.04∗∗∗ 33.21∗∗∗ 37.14∗∗∗ 36.6∗∗∗ 34.33∗∗∗ 
𝑅2 (within) 0.3326 0.2211 0.2065 0.2882 0.2989 0.2558 0.2974 0.2781 0.2213 
Corr(𝜇𝑖, 𝑋) −0.790 −0.801 −0.841 −0.815 −0.817 −0.834 −0.828 −0.830 −0.848 
Sargan-Hansen 
p-value 
0.001 0.0139 0.0904 0.1147 0.1998 0.4383 0.0102 0.0457 0.2321 
First stage least squares regression  
Dependent 
variable 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polity 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polity 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
Polity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political  0.673∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗ 
stability (0.07) (0.049) (0.198) (0.072) (0.05) (0.202) (0.071) (0.049) (0.202) 
Government  0.284∗ −0.079 −1.228∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗ −0.044 −1.215∗∗∗ 0.156 −0.134 −1.634∗∗∗ 
effectiveness (0.145) (0.101) (0.411) (0.151) (0.105) (0.426) (0.148) (0.103) (0.423) 
GDP growth  2.280∗∗∗ 0.545 7.883∗∗∗ 2.223∗∗∗ 0.572 7.70∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 0.411 7.408∗∗∗ 
rate (0.618) (0.428) (1.745) (0.631) (0.438) (1.774) (0.613) (0.428) (1.750) 
Log GDP  −2.309∗∗∗ 0.316 −3.506∗∗ −2.417∗∗∗ 0.277 −3.193∗∗ −1.983∗∗∗ 0.602∗ −2.89∗∗ 
per capita (0.487) (0.337) (1.376) (0.501) (0.348) (1.41) (0.502) (0.350) (1.432) 
Inflation −0.021 0.159 −0.783 −0.039 0.156 −0.673 0.019 0.222 −0.694 
rate (0.226) (0.156) (0.638) (0.230) (0.159) (0.646) (0.225) (0.157) (0.643) 
Unemployment  0.310 −0.668 4.405 0.517 −0.60 6.034 0.551 −0.331 6.071 
rate (1.499) (1.037) (4.233) (1.533) (1.064) (4.311) (1.496) (1.043) (4.268) 
Urban  7.050∗∗∗ 1.341∗ 13.825∗∗∗ 7.219∗∗∗ 1.459∗ 13.533∗∗∗ 6.268∗∗∗ 0.946 13.55∗∗∗ 
population (1.067) (0.738) (3.015) (1.091) (0.757) (3.068) (1.080) (0.753) (3.082) 
Credit to  0.260 0.404∗∗ 2.254∗∗∗ 0.275 0.429∗∗∗ 2.293∗∗∗ 0.119 0.337∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 
private sector (0.233) (0.161) (0.658) (0.237) (0.164) (0.666) (0.235) (0.164) (0.671) 
Financial  0.750∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.381 0.72∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.156 0.572∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.092 
freedom (0.247) (0.171) (0.696) (0.253) (0.175) (0.711) (0.251) (0.175) (0.715) 
Property  0.872∗∗∗ −0.036 −2.069∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ −0.076 −2.00∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 0.206 −2.15∗∗∗ 
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rights (0.321) (0.222) (0.906) (0.329) (0.228) (0.925) (0.327) (0.228) (0.934) 
_cons 8.005∗∗∗ 2.681∗∗∗ 8.538∗∗∗ 8.282∗∗∗ 2.783∗∗∗ 7.688∗∗∗ 7.384∗∗∗ 1.922∗∗∗ 6.887∗ 
 (1.420) (0.982) (4.01) (1.465) (1.017) (4.121) (1.466) (1.022) (4.182) 
F-stat 18.35∗∗∗ 10.62∗∗∗ 11.52∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗ 10.23∗∗∗ 11.04∗∗∗ 18.46∗∗∗ 10.04∗∗∗ 12.48∗∗∗ 
𝑅2 (within) 0.1783 0.1115 0.1199 0.1791 0.1124 0.1202 0.1888 0.1124 0.136 
No. of obs. 921 921 921 883 883 883 868 868 868 
No. of countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
° indicates significance between 10% and 15% level, while no asterisk means the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Countries scoring the lowest rate in the civil liberties index have limited or no freedom 
of association, that include legal or practical constraints on trade unions, peasant 
organizations, civic organizations and interest groups. 
As for the control variables, the fixed-effects OLS and IV 2SLS regressions in Tables 4 
and 5 show a statistically significant positive correlation between financial cooperatives 
development and financial freedom index that provides additional support to my 
hypothesis that strict government control over the allocation of credit and the quality of 
financial regulations play important role in the development of financial cooperatives. 
The financial freedom index measures the degree of financial sector independence from 
government control and interference. Specifically, the index measures the quality of 
financial regulations (which should be limited to enforcing contractual obligations and 
controlling market failures), direct and indirect intervention by the state in financial 
institutions, financial and capital market development, openness to foreign competition 
and government’s control over the allocation of credit.  
The results also show statistically significant negative correlation between property 
rights and financial cooperatives development, in the fixed-effects OLS and IV 2SLS 
regressions, in Tables 4 and 5. These results are inconsistent with the law and finance 
theory, and contradict the broader consensus in favour of property rights protection as a 
key institutional requirement for financial development, investment and economic 
growth. The common argument in favour of property rights on assets and returns is that 
secure property rights encourages individuals and firms to better allocate their 
resources, and gives incentives for savers to invest in the banking sector and the 
financial market as a result of increased confidence in legal institutions (Beck and 
Levine, 2008: 251). 
Claessens and Laeven (2003: 2401–2402) found that better property rights lead to 
higher economic growth, and that the impact on growth is higher with improved access 
to finance, using the same property rights indicator obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index. However, the negative correlation between the 
growth of financial cooperatives and protection of property rights found here is not as 
odd as it seems. The property rights index measures the degree to which private 
property rights are protected by clear laws that are efficiently enforced by the state; 
thus, legal protection over property rights are primarily benefiting those who already 
possess ‘formal’ assets, and therefore can obtain finance from commercial banks in the 
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first place. Whereas members of financial cooperatives are usually part of the informal 
economy, and workers and self-employed individuals do not usually benefit from these 
property rights. Strict laws for property rights then may restrict the economic activities 
of the informal sector, imposing pressure on financial cooperatives’ members. The share 
of the informal sector to GDP varies from around 30% in Asia and Latin America to 
64% in sub-Saharan Africa (Jutting and Laiglesia, 2009), and one-half to three-quarters 
of non-agricultural employment in developing countries is informal employment, a 
figure which would significantly increase if informal employment in agriculture is 
included (ILO, 2002: 5). In any case, there is a need for further theoretical and empirical 
investigation to understand the relationship between financial cooperatives and property 
rights. 
Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between financial cooperatives development 
and GDP per capita, with the statistical significance increases noticeably in the IV 2SLS 
regressions. The annual GDP growth rate was found to have a positive correlation with 
financial cooperatives’ penetration rate, but no statistical significance correlations were 
found between GDP growth and financial cooperatives’ deposits or assets per GDP. 
These results are, to a large extend, similar to Périlleux et al. (2016) who only used 
penetration rate and number of cooperative institutions as indicators for the 
development of financial cooperatives. However, contrary to Périlleux et al. (2016), 
domestic credit provided by banks per GDP here is positively correlated with the three 
financial cooperatives’ indicators, suggesting that there is a strong likelihood that 
financial sector development is positively correlated with the development of financial 
cooperatives. Taking into account that Périlleux et al. (2016: 121–122) had reported a 
slightly small R2 for the penetration rate regressions (0.01 for fixed-effects, 0.04 for 
random-effects and 0.1 for IV 2sls). In addition, unemployment rate was found 
positively correlated only with financial cooperatives’ deposits per GDP using IV 2SLS 
regression, whereas the fixed-effects results showed weak or no statistical significance 
at all. Finally, the percentage of population living in urban areas was found positively 
correlated with financial cooperatives’ deposits and assets per GDP, suggesting that 
probably financial cooperatives can mobilize more deposits in countries where 
urbanization is high, which would be a change in the traditional characteristics of 
financial cooperatives as they used to focus mainly on rural areas. 
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5. Conclusion 
I tried here to explain how political institutions can influence the trend of development 
of financial cooperatives, arguing that autocratic regimes may deliberately oppose the 
existence of a strong financial cooperative sector. Certainly, there is no single factor that 
can explain the evolutionary development of financial cooperatives, as they do not 
operate in isolation. Like any other economic institutions, financial cooperatives are the 
product of the surrounding economic structure, and get influenced by the performance 
of the whole financial sector, and the presence of supportive legal framework, as well as 
the historical and cultural uniqueness of each country. All these factors are of no less 
importance for the development of financial cooperatives, and should be empirically 
explored in future research. However, political institutions and those who possess large 
political power have a strong incentive to influence all these factors, and the results 
presented in this study suggest that political institutions are major determinant for the 
development of financial cooperatives. 
In the current phase of financial capitalism, and the legitimate growing concern about 
unequal wealth distribution, it is important to establish well-functioning financial sector 
that serves the interests of the masses and not just few large shareholders or narrow 
governing elites, and that the financial sector is efficiently able to reallocate people’s 
deposits in value-added investments that serve the real economy and the whole society. 
Thus, it is important to recognize the political and economic potentials of financial 
cooperatives, as independent members-owned financial intermediary institutions that 
represent the interests of the low and middle income populations, and that can help in 
redistributing economic resources and political power in societies. In many developing 
countries, small households and rural populations are confronted with a problem of 
inefficient resources utilization, especially their savings. As large portion of people’s 
savings are transferred to larger banks outside the local community; financial 
cooperatives are best able to mobilize these resources for the benefit of the local 
economy, and are also able to attract external funds; otherwise, these resources are 
rarely utilized in productive investments inside these communities. 
There is a common concern over the politicization of the cooperative movement coming 
from historical practices, although it is clear that the cooperative movement can hardly 
be isolated from politics. The focus should rather be on making sure that cooperatives 
do not become controlled by the government or absorbed by political parties, nor 
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narrow elites that do not seek the benefits of the members and the society. But a 
political role for financial cooperatives is merely inevitable. Financial cooperatives are 
not only financial intermediaries; they are also civil society organizations, with a main 
objective of realizing the social and economic interests of their members. By protecting 
and advocating for their members’ interests, they can become representing and 
defending the interests of particular groups in the society, usually the low and middle-
income classes, and who are rarely represented by any political or economic groups in 
most developing countries. Financial cooperatives can also act as ‘schools of 
democracy’. Democratic participation by citizens in the public sphere does not only 
imply voting in elections or enrolment in political parties. Citizens’ participation can 
also take the form of joining pressure or advocacy groups, federations or unions, or any 
other means that enable them to express their voices and pursue their interests. 
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